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Abstract. Characterizing the decoding failure rate of iteratively de-
coded Low- and Moderate-Density Parity Check (LDPC/MDPC) codes
is paramount to build cryptosystems based on them, able to achieve in-
distinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. In this pa-
per, we provide a statistical worst-case analysis of our proposed iterative
decoder obtained through a simple modification of the classic in-place
bit-flipping decoder. This worst case analysis allows both to derive the
worst-case behaviour of an LDPC/MDPC code picked among the family
with the same length, rate and number of parity checks, and a code-
specific bound on the decoding failure rate. The former result allows us
to build a code-based cryptosystem enjoing the δ-correctness property
required by IND-CCA2 constructions, while the latter result allows us
to discard code instances which may have a decoding failure rate sig-
nificantly different from the average one (i.e., representing weak keys),
should they be picked during the key generation procedure.
Keywords: Bit-flipping decoding, cryptography, decoding failure rate,
LDPC codes, MDPC codes, weak keys.
1 Introduction
Code based cryptosystems, pioneered by McEliece [16], are among the oldest
public-key cryptosystems, and have survived a significant amount of cryptanal-
ysis, remaining unbroken even for quantum-equipped adversaries [5]. This still
holds true for both the original McEliece construction, and the one by Nieder-
reiter [18], when both instantiated with Goppa codes, as they both rely on the
same mathematical trapdoor, i.e., having the adversary solve the search ver-
sion of the decoding problem for a general linear code, which was proven to be
NP-Hard in [4].
The public-key of such schemes corresponds to an obfuscated representation
of the underlying error correcting code (either the generator matrix for McEliece,
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or the parity-check matrix for Niederreiter), equipped with a decoding technique
that can efficiently correct a non-trivial amount of errors. Since the obfuscated
form of either the generator or the parity-check matrix should be indistinguish-
able from the one of a random code with the same length and dimension, both
the original McEliece and Niederreiter proposals have public-key sizes which
grow essentially quadratically in the error correction capacity of the code, on
which the provided security level itself depends.
The large public-key size required in these cryptosystems has hindered their
practical application in many scenarios. A concrete way of solving this problem is
to employ codes described by matrices with a Quasi-Cyclic (QC) structure, which
result in public-key sizes growing linearly in the code length. However, employing
QC algebraic codes has proven to be a security issue, as the additional structure
given by the quasi-cyclicity allows an attacker to deduce the underlying structure
of the secret code [11]. By contrast, code families obtained from a random sparse
parity-check matrix do not suffer from the same problem, and have lead to
the successful proposal of Quasi-Cyclic Low-Density Parity-Check (QC-LDPC)
codes or Quasi-Cyclic Moderate-Density Parity-Check (QC-MDPC) codes [3,17]
as code families to build a secure and efficient instance of either the McEliece or
the Niederreiter cryptosystem.
However, the efficient iterative algorithms used for decoding Low-Density
Parity-Check (LDPC) and Moderate-Density Parity-Check (MDPC) codes are
not bounded distance decoders, yielding a non-zero probability of obtaining a
decoding failure, known as Decoding Failure Rate (DFR), which translates into
a decryption failure rate for the corresponding code-based cryptosystems. The
presence of a non-null DFR was shown to be exploitable by an active adver-
sary, which has access to a decryption oracle (the typical scenario of a Cho-
sen Ciphertext Attack (CCA)), to extract information on the secret QC-LDPC
or QC-MDPC code [10, 13]. To reliably avoid such attacks, cryptosystem con-
structions providing indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack
(IND-CCA2) guarantees, even when considering decoding failures, were analyzed
in [6, 14]. In order for the IND-CCA2 security guarantees to hold, the construc-
tions require that the average of the DFR over all the keypairs, which an adver-
sary is able to induce crafting messages, is below a given threshold δ; a definition
known as δ-correctness [14]. Such a threshold δ must be exponentially small in
the security parameter of the scheme, in turn calling for requirements on the
DFR of the underlying code that cannot be estimated via numerical simulations
(e.g., DFR≤ 2−128).
The impossibility of validating the DFR through numerical simulations has
spurred significant efforts in modelling the behaviour of iterative decoders for
QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC codes, with the goal of finding reliable tools to assess
the DFR [2, 20, 21, 23, 25]. A subset of the aforementioned works consider a
very small number of iterations of the decoder, providing code-specific exact
bounds for the DFR [20, 21, 25]; however, employing such bounds to perform
the code-parameter design results in impractically large public-key sizes. In [23],
the authors adopt a completely different approach which extrapolates the DFR
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in the desired regime from numerical simulations performed with higher DFR
values. This method assumes that the exponentially decreasing trend of the DFR
holds as the code length is increased while keeping the rate constant. Such an
assumption, however, does not rest on a theoretical basis. Finally, in [2] the
authors characterize the DFR of a two-iteration out-of-place decoder, providing
a closed-form method to derive an estimate of the average DFR over all the QC-
LDPC codes with the same length, rate and density, under the assumption that
the bit-flipping decisions taken during the first iteration are independent from
each other. In the recent work [8], authors have highlighted an issue concerning
possible weak keys of QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC code-based cryptosystems, i.e.,
keypairs obtained from codes having a DFR significantly lower than the average
one.
Contributions. We provide an analysis of the DFR of an in-place iterative Bit
Flipping (BF)-decoder for QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC codes acting on the esti-
mated error locations in a randomized fashion for a fixed number of iterations.
We provide a closed form statistical model for such a decoder, allowing us to
derive a worst-case behaviour at each iteration, under clearly stated assump-
tions. We provide both an analysis of the DFR of the said decoder in the worst
case scenario for the average QC-LDPC/QC-MDPC code, and we exploit the
approach of [21] to derive a hard bound on the performance of the decoder on
a given QC-LDPC/QC-MDPC code. While our analysis on the behavior of a
QC-LDPC/QC-MDPC code allows us to match the requirements for a δ-correct
cryptosystem [14], the hard bound we provide for the behavior of the decoder on
a specific code allows us to discard weak keys during the key generation phase,
solving any concern about the use of weak keys. We provide a confirmation of the
effectiveness of our analysis by comparing its results with numerical simulations
of the described in-place decoder.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we will use uppercase (resp. lowercase) bold letters to
denote matrices (resp. vectors). Given a matrix A, its i-th row and j-th column
are denoted as Ai,: and A:,j , respectively, while the entry on the i-th row, j-th
column is denoted as ai,j . Given a vector a, its length is denoted as |a|, while the
i-th element is denoted as ai, with 0 ≤ i ≤ |a|−1; finally, the support (i.e., the set
of positions of the asserted elements in a sequence) and the Hamming weight of
a are denoted as S (a) and wH (a), respectively. We will use Pn, n ≥ 1, to denote
the set of n! permutations of n elements, represented as a set of integers from 0
to n−1, while the notation π
$
←− Pn is employed to randomly and uniformly pick
an element in Pn, denoting the picked permutation of integers in {0 . . . , n− 1}
as π.
As far as the cryptoschemes are concerned, in the following we will make
use of a QC-LDPC/QC-MDPC code C, with length n = n0p, dimension k =
(n0 − 1)p and redundancy r = n− k = p. The private-key will coincide with the
parity-check matrix H = [H0,H1, · · · ,Hn0−1] ∈ F
r×n
2 , where each Hi, 0 ≤ i ≤
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n0 − 1 is a binary circulant matrix of size p × p and fixed Hamming weight v
of each column/row. Therefore, H has constant column-weight v and constant
row-weight w = n0v, and we say that H is (v, w)-regular.
When considering the case of the McEliece construction, the public-key may
be chosen as the systematic generator matrix of the code. The plaintext is in the
form c = mG+ e, c ∈ F1×n2 , where m ∈ F
1×n
2 , e ∈ F
1×n
2 and wH (e) = t. The
decryption algorithm takes as input the ciphertext c to compute the syndrome
s = cH⊤ = eH⊤, s ∈ F1×r2 , and the private-key H to fed a syndrome decoding
algorithm with both s and H and derive e, from which the original message is
recovered looking at the first k elements of c− e.
When the Niederreiter construction is considered, the public-key is defined as
the systematic parity-check matrix of the code, obtained from the private-key as
M = H−10 H ∈ F
r×n
2 . In this case, the message to be encrypted coincides with the
error vector e ∈ F1×n2 , wH (e) = t, while the encryption algorithm computes the
ciphertext c = eM⊤, c ∈ F1×r2 as a syndrome. The decryption algorithm takes
as input the ciphertext c and the private-key H to compute a private-syndrome
s = cH⊤0 = eM
⊤H⊤0 = eH
⊤(H⊤0 )
−1H⊤0 = eH
⊤ and, subsequently, fed with it
a syndrome decoding algorithm to derive the original message e.
3 Randomized In-place Bit-flipping Decoder
In this section we describe a slightly modified version of the BF decoder originally
proposed by Gallager in 1963 [12]. We focus on the in-place BF-decoder in which,
at each bit evaluation, the decoder computes the number of unsatisfied parity-
check equations in which the bit participates: when this number exceeds some
threshold (which may be chosen according to different rules), then the bit is
flipped and the syndrome is updated. Decoding proceeds until a null syndrome
is obtained or a prefixed maximum number of iterations is reached.
The algorithm we analyze is reported in Algorithm 1. Inputs of the decoder
are the binary parity-check matrix H, the syndrome s, the maximum number
of iterations itermax and a vector b of length itermax, such that the i-th
iteration uses bi as threshold. The only difference with the classic in-place BF
decoder is that the estimates on the error vector bits are processed in a random
order, driven by a random permutation (generated at line 3). For this reason,
we call this decoder Randomized In-Place Bit-Flipping (RIP-BF) decoder. Such
a randomization, which is common to prevent side-channel analysis [1, 15] (and
typically goes by the name of instruction shuffling in that context), is crucial in
our analysis, since it allows us to derive a worst case analysis, as we describe in
the following section.
3.1 Assessing Bit-flipping Probabilities
In this section we describe a statistical approach to model the behaviour of
the RIP-BF decoder. We assume that the bit evaluations are independent and
uncorrelated, and depend only on the number of the bits of eˆ which do not match
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Algorithm 1: Randomized In-Place BF decoder
Input: s ∈ Fr2: syndrome
H ∈ Fr×n2 : private parity-check matrix
Output: eˆ ∈ Fn2 : recovered error value
s ∈ Fr2: syndrome, null if error eˆ = e
Data: itermax ≥ 1: maximum number of (outer loop) iterations
b = [b1, . . . , bitermax ], bk ∈ {⌈
v
2
⌉, . . . , v}, 1 ≤ k ≤ itermax: flip thresholds
1 iter← 0, eˆ← 0n
2 while (iter < itermax) ∧ (wH (s) > 0) do
3 pi
$
←− Pn // random permutation of size n
4 foreach eˆj ∈ pi(eˆ) do
5 upc← 0
6 for i← 0 to r − 1 do
7 upc← upc+ (si · hi,j)
8 if upc ≥ biter then
9 eˆj ← eˆj ⊕ 1 // estimated error vector update
10 for i← 0 to r − 1 do
11 si ← si ⊕ hi,j
12 iter← iter+ 1 // update of the iterations counter
13 return {s, eˆ}
the ones of e at the beginning of the outer loop iterations. Such an assumption
is captured by the following statement.
Consider the execution of steps in Algorithm 1 from the beginning of an
outer loop iteration (line 3). For each position j, with 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1, of the
unknown error vector, e, (or equivalently, for each column of the matrix H) if
the number of the unsatisfied parity-checks (upc) influenced by ej exceeds the
predefined threshold chosen for the current (outer loop) iteration, biter, then
the j-th position of the estimated error vector, eˆj, is flipped and the value of the
syndrome is updated (lines 6-9). Denoting as
– Pf |1 = Prob ((j-th upc) ≥ biter | ej = 1), the probability that the computa-
tion of the j-th upc yields an outcome greater or equal to the current thresh-
old (thus, triggering a flip of eˆj) conditioned by the hyphotetical event of
knowing that the actual j-th error bit is asserted, i.e., ej = 1;
– Pm|0 = Prob ((j-th upc) < biter | ej = 0), the probability that the computa-
tion of the j-th upc yields an outcome less than the current threshold (thus,
maintaining the bit eˆj unchanged) conditioned by the hyphotetical event of
knowing that the actual j-th error bit is null, i.e., ej = 0.
In the following analyses, the statement below is assumed to hold.
Assumption 1 Both Pf |1 and Pm|0 are not a function of the bit-position in the
actual error vector (i.e., j, in the previous formulae), although both probabilities
are a function of the total number tˆ = wH (e⊕ eˆ) of positions over which the
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unknown error e and the estimated error vector eˆ differ, at the beginning of the
j-th inner loop iteration (line 5 in Algorithm 1).
To derive closed formulae for both Pf |1 and Pm|0, we focus on QC-LDPC/QC-
MDPC parity-check matrices as described in Section 2 with column weight v
and row weight w = n0v and observe that Algorithm 1 uses the columns of
the parity-check matrix, for each outer loop iteration, in an order that is chosen
with a uniformly random draw (line 3), while the computation performed at lines
6–7 is independent by the processing order of each cell of the selected column.
According to this, in the following we “idelize” the structure of the parity check-
matrix, assuming each row of H independent from the others and modeled as a
sample of a uniform random variable, distributed over all possible sequences of
n bits with weight w. More formally,
Assumption 2 LetH be a r×n quasi-cyclic block-circulant (v, w)-regular parity-
check matrix and let s be the 1×r syndrome corresponding to a 1×n error vector
e that is modeled as a sample from a uniform random variable distributed over
the elements in F1×n2 with weight t.
We assume that each row hi,:, 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, of the parity-check matrix H is
well modeled as a sample from a uniform random variable distributed over the
elements of F1×n2 with weight w.
Lemma 1. From Assumption 2, the probabilities that the i-th bit of the syn-
drome (0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1) is asserted knowing that the z-th bit of the error vector
(0 ≤ z ≤ n − 1) is null or not, i.e., Prob (si = 1|ez) = Prob (〈hi,:, e〉 = 1|ez),
〈hi,:, e〉 =
⊕n−1
j=0 hi,j · ej, can be expressed for each bit position z, 0 ≤ z ≤ n− 1,
of the error vector as follows:
ρ0,u = Prob (〈hi,:, e〉 = 1 | ez = 0) =
∑min{w,t}
l=0, l odd
(
w
l
)(
n−w
t−l
)(
n−1
t
)
ρ1,u = Prob (〈hi,:, e〉 = 1 | ez = 1) =
∑min{w−1,t−1}
l=0, l even
(
w−1
l
)(
n−w
t−1−l
)(
n−1
t−1
)
Consequentially, the probability that Algorithm 1 performs a bit-flip of an ele-
ment of the estimated error vector, eˆz, when the corresponding bit of the actual
error vector is asserted, ez = 1, i.e., Pf |1, and the probability that Algorithm 1
maintains the value of the estimated error vector, eˆz, when the corresponding bit
of the actual error vector is null, ez = 0, i.e., Pm|0, are:
Pf |1 =
v∑
upc=b
(
v
upc
)
ρ
upc
1,u (1 − ρ1,u)
v−upc,
Pm|0 =
b−1∑
upc=0
(
v
upc
)
ρ
upc
0,u (1 − ρ0,u)
v−upc.
Proof. Provided in Appendix C.
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3.2 Bounding Bit-flipping Probabilities for a Given Code
Given a QC-LDPC code C with its r×n (v, w)-regular parity-check matrixH, let
us consider each column of H, h:,z, 0 ≤ z ≤ n− 1, as a Boolean vector equipped
with element-wise addition and multiplication denoted as ⊕ and ∧, respectively.
Let Γ be the n × n integer matrix, where each element γx,y ∈ {0, . . . , v}, with
0 ≤ x, y ≤ n − 1, is computed as the weight of the element-wise multiplication
between two different columns, and 0 otherwise, i.e.,
γx,y =
{
wH (h:,x ∧ h:,y) x 6= y
0 x = y
The integer matrix Γ is symmetric and, when derived from a block-circulant
matrix, is made of circulant blocks, as well.
An alternate way of exhibiting the probability Pf |1 that Algorithm 1 performs
a bit-flip of an element of the estimated error vector, eˆz, when the corresponding
bit of the actual error vector is asserted, i.e., ez = 1, consists in counting how
many of the
(
n−1
t−1
)
error vectors e, with ez = 1, are such that the z-th upc counter
computed employing the corresponding syndrome (see lines 6–7) is above the
pre-defined threshold b:
Pf |1 =
| {e s.t. (z-th upc) ≥ b} |(
n−1
t−1
) . (1)
Noting that the computation of z-th upc can be derived as a function of the
unknown error vector e as follows:
z-th upc = v − wH

 ⊕
j∈{S(e)\{z}}
(h:,z ∧ h:,j)

 ≥ v − ∑
j∈{S(e)\{z}}
γz,j,
the following inequality concerning the numerator of the fraction in Eq. (1) holds:
| {e s.t. (z-th upc) ≥ b} | ≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣

e s.t.

v − ∑
j∈{S(e)\{z}}
γz,j

 ≥ b


∣∣∣∣∣∣
The cardinality of the set on the right-hand side of the above inequality asks for
the counting of all error vectors such that the sum of the elements on the z-th
row of the matrix Γ indexed by the positions in {S (e)\{z}} (with |{S (e)\{z}}|=
t− 1) is less than v − b: i.e.,
∑
j∈{S(e)\{z}} γz,j ≤ v − b. The answer to the said
question is equivalent to counting the number of solutions of the corresponding
subset sum problem [7], that is finding a subset of |{S (e)\ {z}}|= t− 1 elements
out of the ones in the row γz,: adding up to at most v − b. A straightforward
computation of such a counting is unfeasible for cryptographic relevant values of
the involved parameters, exhibiting an exponential complexity in the correction
capacity of the code t.
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However, observing that, for QC-LDPC codes, the number ηz of unique values
on each row γz,: of the matrix Γ is far lower than t, therefore we designed
an algorithm computing the same result with a complexity exponential in ηz ,
reported in Appendix B. In the following, for the sake of conciseness, the outcome
of the said algorithm fed with a row of the matrix Γ, the cardinality |{S (e) \
{z}}|= t − 1 (i.e., the number of terms of the summation), and the threshold
value that the sum must honor is denoted as: N (γz,:, t− 1, threshold).
Pf |1 ≥
max
0≤z≤n−1
{N (γz,:, t− 1, v − b)}(
n−1
t−1
) . (2)
With similar arguments, a lower bound on Pm|0 can be derived, obtaining:
Pm|0 ≥
max
0≤z≤n−1
{N (γz,:, t, b− 1)}(
n−1
t
) . (3)
4 Modeling the DFR of the RIP-decoder
Using the probabilities, Pf |1,Pm|0, that we have derived in the previous section,
under Assumption 1 we can derive a statistical model for the RIP-BF decoder.
To this end, we now focus on a single iteration of the outer loop of Algorithm 1.
In particular, as we describe next, we consider a worst-case evolution for the
decoder, by assuming that, at each iteration of the inner loop, it evolves through
a path that ends in the a decoding success with the lowest probability. We obtain
a decoding success if the decoder terminates the inner loop iteration in the state
where the estimate of the error eˆ matches the actual error e. Indeed, in such a
case, we have wH (e⊕ eˆ) = 0.
Let e¯ be the error estimate at the beginning of the outer loop of Algorithm 1
(line 3), and eˆ be the error estimate at the beginning of the inner loop of the
same algorithm (line 5). In other words, e¯ is a snapshot of the error estimate
made by the RIP decoder before a sweep of n estimated error bit evaluations is
made, while eˆ is the value of the estimated error vector before each estimated
error bit is evaluated.
Let tˆ denote the number of residual erroneous bit estimations at the beginning
of the inner loop iteration, that is tˆ = wH (e⊕ eˆ). From now on, we highlight
the dependency of Pf |1 and Pm|0 from the current value of tˆ, writing them down
as Pf |1(tˆ) and Pm|0(tˆ).
We denote as π the permutation picked in line 3 of Algorithm 1. Let P∗n be
the set of all permutations π∗ ∈ P∗n such that
S (π∗(e)⊕ π∗(e¯)) = {n− tˆ, n− tˆ+ 1, · · · , n− 1}, ∀π∗ ∈ P∗n.
Let Prob ( eˆ 6= e| π ∈ Pn) be the probability that the estimated error vector
eˆ at the end of the current inner loop iteration is different from e, conditioned
by the fact that the permutation π was applied at the beginning of the outer
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loop. Similarly, we define Prob ( eˆ 6= e| π∗ ∈ P∗n). Note that it can be verified
that Pf |1(tˆ) ≥ Pf |1(tˆ + 1),Pm|0(tˆ) ≥ Pm|0(tˆ + 1), ∀tˆ, as increasing the number
of current mis-estimated error bits, increases the likelihood of a wrong decoder
decision. By leveraging the assumption made in the previous section, we now
prove that the decoder reaches a correct decoding at the end of the outer loop
with the least probability each time a π∗ ∈ P∗n is applied at the beginning of the
outer loop.
Lemma 2. The execution path of the inner loop in Algorithm 1 yielding the
worst possible decoder success rate is the one taking place when π∗ ∈ P∗n is
applied at the beginning of the outer loop, that is:
∀π ∈ Pn, ∀π
∗ ∈ P∗n, Prob ( eˆ 6= e| π ∈ Pn) ≤ Prob ( eˆ 6= e| π
∗ ∈ P∗n) .
Proof. See Appendix D.
From now on we will assume that, in each iteration, a permutation from the
set P∗n is picked; in other words, we are assuming that the decoder is always
constrained to reach a decoding success through the worst possible execution
path. Let us define the following two sets: E1 = S(e), and E0 = {0, . . . , n− 1} \
S(e). Denote with tˆ0 = |{S(e⊕ e¯) ∩ E0}|, that is the number of places where
the estimated error at the beginning of the outer loop iteration e¯ differs from the
actual e, in positions included in E0. Analogously, define tˆ1 = |{S(e⊕ e¯) ∩ E1}|.
Furthermore, let
i) ProbP∗n
(
ω
E0−−→ x
)
denote the probability that the decoder in Algorithm
1, starting from a state where wH (eˆ⊕ e) = ω, and acting in the order
specified by a worst case permutation π∗ ∈ P∗n ends in a state with tˆ0 = x
after completing the inner loop at lines 4 – 11;
ii) ProbP∗n
(
ω
E1−−→ x
)
denote the probability that the decoder in Algorithm 1,
starting from a state where wH (eˆ⊕ e) = ω, and acting in the order specified
by a worst case permutation π∗ ∈ P∗n ends in a state with tˆ1 = x residual
errors among the bits indexed by E1 after completing the loop at lines 4–11;
iii) ProbP∗n
(
ω −→
i
x
)
as the probability that, starting from a state such that
wH (eˆ⊕ e) = ω, after i iterations the outer loop at lines 2–12 of Algorithm
1, each one operating with a worst case permutation, ends in a state where
wH (eˆ⊕ e) = x.
The expressions of the probabilities i) and ii) are derived in Appendix A, and
only depend on the probabilities Pf |1(tˆ) and Pm|0(tˆ).
We now describe how the aforementioned probabilities can be used to express
the worst case DFR after itermax iterations, which we denote as DFR∗itermax.
First of all, we straightforwardly have
ProbP∗n
(
ω −→
1
x
)
=
t∑
δ=max{0 ; x−(n−ω)}
ProbP∗n
(
ω
E0−−→ x− δ
)
ProbP∗n
(
ω
E1−−→ δ
)
.
(4)
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We can denote as tˆ(i) = wH
(
e⊕ eˆ(iter)
)
, that is: tˆ(i) corresponds to the number
of residual errors after the i-th outer loop iteration. Then, by considering all
possible configurations of such values, and taking into account that the first
iteration begins with t residual errors, we have
ProbP∗n
(
t −−−−−−→
itermax−1
tˆ
(itermax−1)
)
=
n∑
tˆ(0)=0
· · ·
n∑
tˆ(itermax−2)=0
ProbP∗n
(
tˆ
(imax−2) −→
1
tˆ
(itermax−1)
)
itermax−2∏
j=0
ProbP∗n
(
tˆ
(j−1) −→
1
tˆ
(j)
)
, (5)
where, to have a consistent notation, we consider tˆ(−1) = t. The above formula
is very simple and, essentially, takes into account all possible transitions starting
from an initial number of residual errors equal to t and ending in x residual
errors. Taking this probability into account, the DFR after itermax iterations
is straightforwardly obtained as
DFR∗itermax = 1−
n∑
tˆ(itermax−1)=0
ProbP∗n
(
t −−−−−−→
itermax−1
tˆ(itermax−1)
)
ProbP∗n
(
tˆ(itermax−1) −→
1
0
)
.
(6)
4.1 Analyzing a Single-iteration Decoder
For the case of the decoder performing just one iteration, the simple expression
of the DFR has been derived in the proof of Lemma 2, that is
DFR∗1 = 1− ProbP∗n
(
t −→
1
0
)
=
(
Pm|0(t)
)n−t t∏
j=1
Pf |1(j).
Actually, for just one iteration, the average DFR (corresponding to the use of
a random permutation π) can be approximated in a very simple way, as follows.
Let ai, ai+1, with i ∈ [0; t − 2], be two consecutive elements of S (π(e)). Then
denote with d the average zero-run lenght in e, d = E [ai+1 − ai] =
n−t
t+1 , ∀i ∈
[0; t− 2] where E[·] denotes the expected value. Consequently, we can write
DFR1 ≈ 1−

 t∏
j=1
(
Pm|0(j)
)d t∏
l=1
Pf |1(l). (7)
4.2 Simulation Results
In this section we report the results of an experimental validation of the pro-
posed analysis of the behavior of the RIP decoder. As a case study we chose a
QC-LDPC code having the parity check matrix H formed by n0 = 2 circulant
blocks of size p = 4801, column weight v = 45 and we assessed the DFR varying
the error weight t from 10 to 100, attempting to decode 106 error vectors for
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Fig. 1. Experimental validation of the DFR estimates (Est.) through numerical simu-
lations (Sim.). The QC-LDPC code parameters are n0 = 2, p = 4, 801 and v = 45. The
decoding threshold is b0 = 25.
each value of the error weight. To this end, we implemented the RIP decoder
in C99, and run the experiments on an Intel Core i5-6500 CPU running at 3.20
GHz, compiling the code with the GCC 8.3.0 and running the built executables
on Debian GNU/Linux 10.2 (stable). The computation of the worst case DFR
estimates and bounds in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) were realized employing the NTL
library [24], while the solver for the counting version of the subset sum problem
was implemented in plain C++. Computing the entire DFR upper bound relying
on the counting subset sum problem takes significantly less than a second, for the
selected parameters. We report the results considering a bit flipping threshold of
b = 25, for all the iterations; however, we obtained analogous results varying the
bit flipping threshold. The results with thresholds different from 25 are omitted
for lack of space. Figure 1 reports the results of numerical simulations of the
DFR of the RIP decoder running for either one or two iterations, while employ-
ing a random permutation (DFR1 and DFR2) or artificially computing the error
estimates according to the worst-case permutation (DFR∗1 and DFR
∗
2). As it can
be seen, our technique for the DFR estimation provides a perfect match for the
case of a single iteration, while our assumptions turn out to provide a conserva-
tive estimate for the worst-case DFR in the case of a 2-iteration RIP decoder.
In both cases, the actual behavior of the decoder with a random permutation
matches our expectations of having the DFR bounded by both the worst-case
one and the closed form code-specific bound reported in green in Fig. 1. Finally,
it is interesting to note, from an implementation viewpoint, that skipping the
permutation in the case of a single-iteration RIP decoder appears to have no
effect on the simulated DFR (black dots, marked DFRI in Fig. 1). This can be
explained observing that the first iteration of the RIP decoder is actually apply-
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ing the random permutation to the positions of the error estimates which have
randomly-placed discrepancies with the actual error itself.
5 Conclusions
We provided a statistical analysis of the behavior of a randomized in place bit
flipping decoder, derived from the canonical one by randomizing the order in
which the estimated error positions are processed. This modification to the de-
coder allows us to provide a statistical worst-case analysis of the DFR of the de-
coder at hand, both considering the average behavior among all the codes with
the same length, dimension and number of parity checks, and a code-specific
bound for a given QC-LDPC/QC-MDPC. The former analysis can be fruitfully
exploited to design code parameters allowing to obtain DFR values such as the
ones needed to employ QC-LDPC/QC-MDPC codes in constructions providing
IND-CCA2 guarantees under the assumption that the underlying scheme is δ-
correct [14]. The latter result allows us to analyze a given QC-LDPC/QC-MDPC
code to assess whether the DFR it exhibits is above the maximum tolerable one
for an IND-CCA2 construction, thus allowing us to discard weak keypairs upon
generation. We note that our analysis relies on the RIP decoder performing a
finite number of iterations, as opposed to the one provided in [23], in turn al-
lowing a constant-time implementation of the RIP decoder itself. This fact is of
significant practical relevance since the timing information leaked from decoders
performing a variable number of iterations was shown to be as valuable as the
one leaked by decryption failures to a CCA attacker [9, 22], leading to concrete
violations of the IND-CCA2 property.
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A Deriving the Bit-flipping Probabilities for the RIP
Decoder
Denote with tˆ0 = |{S(e⊕ e¯) ∩ E0}|, that is the number of places where the
estimated error at the beginning of the outer loop iteration e¯ differs from the
actual e, in positions included in E0. Analogously, define tˆ1 = |{S(e⊕ e¯) ∩ E1}|.
We now characterize the statistical distribution of tˆ0 and tˆ1 after n iterations
of the inner loop of the RIP-BF decoder are run, processing the estimated error
bit positions in the order pointed out by π∗ ∈ P∗n, i.e., the permutation which
places at the end all the positions j where eˆj 6= ej . We point out that, at the
first iteration of the outer loop of the decoder, this coincides with placing all the
positions where ej = 1 at the end, since e¯ is initialized to the n-binary elements
zero vector, hence e¯⊕ e = e.
In characterizing the distribution of tˆ0, because of Assumption 1, we rely only
on the probabilities Pf |0(t) and Pm|0(t), i.e. the probability that an error esti-
mate bit will be flipped or maintained. In the following, for the sake of simplicity,
we will consider tˆ1 = t, which is the case of the RIP decoder performing the first
outer loop iteration. To model the statistical distribution of tˆ0 we employ the
framework of Probabilistic Finite State Automata (PFSA) [19]. Informally, a
PFSA is a Finite State Automaton (FSA) characterized by transition probabil-
ities for each of the transitions of the FSA. The state of a PFSA is a discrete
probability distribution over the set of FSA states and the probabilities of the
transitions starting from the same FSA state, reading a the same symbol, must
add up to one.
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Fig. 3. Structure of the probabilistic FSA modeling the evolution of the distribution
of the tˆ1 variable. Read characters are reported in black, transition probabilites in red-
We model the statistical distribution of tˆ0 as the state of a PFSA having n−t
FSA states, each one mapped onto a specific value for tˆ0, as depicted in Figure 2.
We consider the underlying FSA to be accepting the input language constituted
by binary strings obtained as the sequences of eˆj 6= ej values, where j is the
error estimate position being processed by the RIP decoder at a given inner
loop iteration. We therefore have that, for the PFSA modeling the evolution of
tˆ0 while the RIP decoder acts on the first n− t positions specified by π∗, all the
read bits will be equal to 0, as π∗ sorts the positions of eˆ so that the (n − t at
the first iteration) positions with no discrepancy between e¯ and e come first.
The transition probability for the PFSA transition from a state tˆ0 = i to
tˆ0 = i+1 requires the RIP decoder to flip a bit of eˆ equal to zero, and matching
the one in the same position of e, causing a discrepancy. Because of Assumption
1, the probability of such a transition is Pf |0(t+ i). , while the probability of the
self-loop transition from tˆ0 = i to tˆ0 = i itself is Pm|0(t+ i).
Note that, during the inner loop iterations of the RIP decoder acting on
positions of eˆ which have no discrepancies it is not possible to decrease the value
tˆ0, as no reduction on the number of discrepancies between eˆ and e can be done
changing values of eˆ which are already equal to the ones in e. Hence, we have
that the probability of transitioning from tˆ0 = i to tˆ0 = i − 1 is zero.
The evolution of a PFSA can be computed simply taking the current state,
represented as the vector y of probabilities for each FSA state and multiplying it
by an appropriate matrix which characterizes the transitions in the PFSA. Such
a matrix is derived as the adjacency matrix of the PFSA graph representation,
keeping only the edges for which the read character matches the edge label,
and substituting the one-values in the adjacency matrix with the probability
labelling the corresponding edge. We obtain the transition matrix modeling an
iteration of the RIP decoder acting on an eˆj = ej (i.e. reading a 0) as the
(n− t+ 1)× (n− t+ 1) matrix:
K0 =


Pm|0(t) Pf |0(t) 0 0 0 0
0 Pm|0(t+ 1) Pf |0(t+ 1) 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 Pm|0(n− 1) Pf |0(n− 1)
0 0 0 0 0 Pm|0(n)


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Since we want to compute the effect on the distribution of tˆ0 after n − t
iterations of the RIP decoder acting on positions j such that eˆj = ej, we can
obtain it simply as yKn−t0 . Note that the subsequent t iterations of the RIP
decoder will not alter the value of tˆ0 as they act on positions j such that ej = 1.
Since we know that, at the beginning of the first iteration y = [Prob
(
tˆ0 = 0
)
=
1, Prob
(
tˆ0 = 1
)
= 0, Prob
(
tˆ0 = 2
)
= 0, · · · , Prob
(
tˆ0 = n− t
)
= 0], we are able
to compute ProbP∗n
(
ω
E0−−→ x
)
as the (x + 1)-th element of yKn−t0 .
We now model the distribution of tˆ1, during the last t iterations of the inner
loop of the RIP decoder performed during an iteration of the outer loop. Note
that, to this end, the first n − t iterations of the inner loop have no effect on
tˆ1. Denote with t
∗ the incorrectly estimated bits wH(e+ eˆ) at the beginning of
the inner loop iterations acting on positions j where eˆj 6= ej . Note that, at the
first iteration of the outer loop of the RIP decoder, t∗ = tˆ0 + t, when the RIP
decoder is about to analyze the first position for which wH(e + e¯). Arguments
analogous to the ones employed to model the PFSA describing the evolution for
tˆ0 allow us to obtain the one modeling the evolution for tˆ1, reported in Figure 3.
We are thus able to obtain the ProbP∗n
(
ω
E1−−→ x
)
PFSA reported in Figure 3
for tˆ1 is z = [Prob
(
tˆ1 = 0
)
= 0, Prob
(
tˆ1 = 0
)
= 0, . . . , Prob
(
tˆ1 = t
)
= 1] and
employing the (t + 1) × (t + 1) transition matrix K1 of the PFSA to compute
zKt1. The value of ProbP∗n
(
ω
E1−−→ x
)
corresponds to the (x + 1)-th element of
zKt1.
B Solving the Counting Subset Sum Problem
In the following, we describe the algorithm computing N (y, η, thr), i.e., the
number of subsets of the elements of y, which have cardinality equal to η, and
which have the sum of their elements lesser than or equal to thr.
In doing this, we leverage the fact that y has only a small number of distinct
elements, z ≪ n = |y|. To this end, we represent y as the sequence of its z distinct
elements [ǫ0, ǫ1, . . . , ǫz−1] in increasing order of their value, i.e., ∀i < j, ei < ej .
Such a sequence is paired with the sequence of the number of times that each ǫi
appears in y, [λ0, λ1, . . . , λz−1].
First of all, we note that the sets which are counted in N (y, η, thr), can
be partitioned according to the number of distinct elements contained in them.
Denote with Ni(y, η, thr) the number of the number of subsets of the elements of
y, with cardinality equal to η, sum lesser or equal to thr, and exactly i distinct
elements. The value of N (y, η, thr) is obtained as the sum over all i ∈ 1, . . . , z
of the values of Ni(y, η, thr). The computation of Ni(y, η, thr) is described in
Algorithm 2.
C Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 3. From Assumption 2, the probabilities that the i-th bit of the syn-
drome (0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1) is asserted knowing that the z-th bit of the error vector
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Algorithm 2: Computation of Ni(y, η, thr)
Input: y: an integer sequence, with elements in {0, . . . v}, |y|= n. The collection admits
repeated items
η: the number of elements of the sought subsets of y
thr: the maximum allowed value of the sum of the η-wide integer subsets of y
i: the number of distinct elements admitted in the subsets
Output: Ni(y, η, thr): the number of subsets of y, of η integers picked with sum ≤ thr
Data: z: the number of distinct elements in y
ǫi: the i-th distinct integer in y, i ∈ {0, . . . , z − 1}, i < j ⇒ ǫi < ǫj
λi: the number of occurrences (multiplicity) of ǫi in y
1 sum← 0
2 if i = 1 then
3 for j ← 0 to z − 1 do
// Pick η terms equal to ǫj: their sum should be ≤ thr
4 if (ǫj · η ≤ thr) ∧ (λj ≥ η) then
5 sum ← sum +
(
λi
η
)
6 return sum
7 else
8 for j ← 0 to z − 1 do
9 m← min{λj , ⌊
thr
ǫj
⌋, η − (i− 1)}
// i− 1 distinct terms must still be placed: place at most η − (i− 1)
10 for k ← 1 to m do
11 sum ← sum +
(λj
k
)
N(i−1) (y \ {ǫ0 . . . ǫj}, η − k, thr− (k · ǫj))
12 return sum
(0 ≤ z ≤ n − 1) is null or not, i.e., Prob (si = 1|ez) = Prob (〈hi,:, e〉 = 1|ez),
〈hi,:, e〉 =
⊕n−1
j=0 hi,j · ej, can be expressed for each bit position z, 0 ≤ z ≤ n− 1,
of the error vector as follows:
ρ0,u = Prob (〈hi,:, e〉 = 1 | ez = 0) =
∑min{w,t}
l=0, l odd
(
w
l
)(
n−w
t−l
)(
n−1
t
)
ρ1,u = Prob (〈hi,:, e〉 = 1 | ez = 1) =
∑min{w−1,t−1}
l=0, l even
(
w−1
l
)(
n−w
t−1−l
)(
n−1
t−1
)
Consequentially, the probability that Algorithm 1 performs a bit-flip of an ele-
ment of the estimated error vector, eˆz, when the corresponding bit of the actual
error vector is asserted, ez = 1, i.e., Pf |1, and the probability that Algorithm 1
maintains the value of the estimated error vector, eˆz, when the corresponding bit
of the actual error vector is null, ez = 0, i.e., Pm|0, are:
Pf |1 =
v∑
upc=b
(
v
upc
)
ρ
upc
1,u (1 − ρ1,u)
v−upc,
Pm|0 =
b−1∑
upc=0
(
v
upc
)
ρ
upc
0,u (1 − ρ0,u)
v−upc.
Proof. For the sake of brevity, we consider the case of ez = 1 deriving the
expression of Pf |1; the proof for Pm|0 can be carried out with similar arguments.
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Given a row hi,: of the parity-check matrixH, such that z ∈ S (hi,:), the equation⊕n−1
j=0 hi,j · ej (in the unknown e) yields a non-null value for the i-th bit of the
syndrome, si, (i.e., the eq. is unsatisfied) if and only if the support of the error
vector e is such that
⊕n−1
j=0 hi,j · ej = 2a+ 1, a ≥ 0, including the term having
j = z, i.e., hi,z · ez = 1. This implies that the cardinality of the set obtained
intersecting the support hi,: with the one of e, |(S (hi,:) \ {z}) ∩ (S (e) \ {z})|,
must be an even number, which in turn cannot be larger than the minimum
between |S (hi,:) \ {i}| = w − 1 and |S (e) \ {i}| = t− 1.
The probability ρ1,u is obtained considering the fraction of the number of
error vector values having an even number of asserted bits matching the asserted
bits ones in a row of H (noting that, for the z-th bit position, both the error and
the row of H are set) on the number of error vector values having t− 1 asserted
bits over n− 1 positions, i.e.,
(
n−1
t−1
)
. The numerator of the said fraction is easily
computed as the sum of all error vector configurations having an even number
0 ≤ l ≤ min{w − 1, t − 1} of asserted bits. Considering a given value for l, the
counting of the error vector values is derived as follows. Picking one of vector
with l asserted bits over w possible positions, i.e., one vector over
(
w−1
l
)
possible
ones, there are
(
n−w
t−1−l
)
possible values of the error vector exhibiting t− 1− l null
bits in the remaining n−w positions; therefore, the total number of vectors with
weigh l is
(
w−1
l
)
·
(
n−w
t−1−l
)
. Repeating the same line of reasoning for each value of
l allows to derive the numerator of the formula defining ρ1,u.
From Assumption 2, the value of any row hi,: is modeled as a random variable
with a Bernoulli distribution having parameter (or expected value) ρ1,u, and each
of these random variables is independent from the others. Consequentially, the
probability that Algorithm 1 performs a bit-flip of an element of the estimated
error vector when the corresponding bit of the actual error vector is asserted and
the counter of the unsatisfied parity checks (upc) is above or equal to a given
threshold b, is derived as the binomial probability obtained adding the outcomes
of v (column-weight of H) i.i.d. Bernoulli trials. ⊓⊔
D Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. The execution path of the inner loop in Algorithm 1 yielding the
worst possible decoder success rate is the one taking place when π∗ ∈ P∗n is
applied at the beginning of the outer loop, that is:
∀π ∈ Pn, ∀π
∗ ∈ P∗n, Prob ( eˆ 6= e| π ∈ Pn) ≤ Prob ( eˆ 6= e| π
∗ ∈ P∗n) .
Proof. First of all, we can write Prob (e′ 6= e| π ∈ Pn) = 1−β(π), where β(π) is
the probability that all bits, evaluated in the order specified by π, are correctly
processed. To visualize the effect of a permutation π∗ ∈ Pn, we can consider the
following representation
π∗(e)⊕ π∗(e¯) = [0, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
length n− tˆ
, 1, 1, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
length tˆ
], ∀π∗ ∈ P∗n.
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The decoder will hence analyze first a run of n− tˆ positions where the differences
between the permuted error π∗(e) vector and π∗(e¯) contain only zeroes, followed
by a run of tˆ positions containing only ones. Thus, we have that
β(π∗) =
(
Pm|0(tˆ)
)n−tˆ
· Pf |1(tˆ) · Pf |1(tˆ− 1) · · ·Pf |1(1)
The former expression can be derived thanks to Assumption 1 as follows. Note
that, the first elements in the first n − tˆ positions of π∗(eˆ) and π∗(e) match,
therefore the decoder makes a correct evaluation if it does not change the value
of π∗(eˆ). This in turn implies that, in case a sequence of n−tˆ correct decisions are
made in the corresponding iterations of the inner loop, each iteration will have
the same probability Pm|0(tˆ) correctly evaluating the current estimated error
bit. This leads to a probability of performing the first n− tˆ iterations taking a
correct decision equal to
(
Pm|0(tˆ)
)n−tˆ
Through an analogous line of reasoning,
observe that the decoder will need to change the value of the current estimated
error bit during the last tˆ iterations of the inner loop. As a consequence, if all
correct decisions are made, the number of residual errors will decrease by one at
each inner loop iteration, yielding the remaining part of the expression.
Consider now a generic permutation π, such that the resulting π(e) has
support {u0, · · · , utˆ−1}; we have
β(pi) =
[
Pm|0(tˆ)
]u0 Pf |1(t) [Pm|0(tˆ− 1)]u1−u0−1 Pf |1(tˆ− 1) · · ·Pf |1(1) [Pm|0(0)]n−1−utˆ−1
=
[
Pm|0(t)
]u0 [Pm|0(0)]n−1−utˆ−1
tˆ−1∏
j=1
[
Pm|0(tˆ− j)
]uj−uj−1−1 tˆ−1∏
l=0
Pf |1(tˆ− l).
We now show that we always have β(π) ≥ β(π∗). Indeed, since Pm|0(0) = 1 and
due to the monotonic trends of Pu and Pf , the following chain of inequalities
can be derived
β(pi) =
[
Pm|0(0)
]n−1−u
tˆ−1
[
Pm|0(tˆ)
]u0 tˆ−1∏
j=1
[
Pm|0(tˆ− j)
]uj−uj−1−1 tˆ−1∏
l=0
Pf |1(tˆ− l)
≥
[
Pm|0(0)
]n−1−u
tˆ−1
[
Pm|0(tˆ)
]u0 tˆ−1∏
j=1
[
Pm|0(tˆ)
]uj−uj−1−1 tˆ−1∏
l=0
Pf |1(tˆ− l)
=
[
Pm|0(0)
]n−1−u
tˆ−1
[
Pm|0(tˆ)
]u0 [Pm|0(tˆ)]utˆ−1−u0−(tˆ−1)
tˆ−1∏
l=0
Pf |1(tˆ− l))
=
[
Pm|0(0)
]n−1−u
tˆ−1
[
Pm|0(tˆ)
]u
tˆ−1−(tˆ−1)
tˆ−1∏
l=0
Pf |1(tˆ− l)
≥
[
Pm|0(tˆ)
]n−1−u
tˆ−1
[
Pm|0(tˆ)
]u
tˆ−1−(tˆ−1)
tˆ−1∏
l=0
Pf |1(tˆ− l)
=
[
Pm|0(tˆ)
]n−tˆ tˆ−1∏
l=0
Pf |1(tˆ− l) = β(pi
∗).
⊓⊔
